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Abstract. This paper examines Argentina’s Caja de Conversión in 1907 and 1908, when a 
financial panic affected a number of other financial markets. Through an analysis of the 
Caja’s monthly balance sheets (digitized in an accompanying workbook), it tests the degree 
of the Caja’s currency board orthodoxy and analyzes the effects of the panic on the 
Argentine economy.  
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1. Introduction  
n the tail of a booming nineteenth century, in the early 1900s 
Argentina’s economy was thriving. The country was a main 
exporter of agricultural products, welcomed European 
immigration, and began to advocate for social unity, all resulting in 
increased productivity, more liberal trade policy, and high investment 
(OECD, undated). According to many, in the early twentieth century, 
Argentina was the most prosperous Latin American country (Frankema & 
Visker, 2011: 71).In light of Japan’s later rapid rise to prosperity and 
Argentina’s steep relative decline, Simon Kuznets, a Nobel laureate in 
economics, is said to have stated, ‚there are four kinds of countries in the 
world: developed countries, undeveloped countries, Japan and Argentina‛ 
(Economist, 2014). (Kuznets meant that Japan was an undeveloped country 
that had become developed, while Argentina was a developed country that 
had become undeveloped.) 
Argentina enjoyed generally strong economic growth in the late 1800s 
despite financial problems. In 1890 Argentina’s problems were the origin of 
a crisis that reached into the center of world finance, London. In the first 
quarter of 1890 the Argentine government had bailed out the federally 
owned Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 
owned by Argentina’s most important province. The bailout took the form 
of a new issue of government currency lent to the banks. The exchange rate, 
which was floating, depreciated about 20 percent. The government was 
also struggling with high interest payments, which amounted to about 40 
percent of its revenues. The financial situation triggered a political crisis 
that included the resignation of the minister of finance in early July, an 
 
a Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, USA. 
. +302531039824 . apopkin2@jhu.edu 
 
O 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 A. Popkin, JEB, 6(4), 2019, p.404-416. 
405 
405 
unsuccessful insurrection in late July, and resignation of the president in 
early August. Argentina suspended payments on its foreign debt. The 
British firm of Baring Brothers & Co., the world’s largest merchant bank, 
had been heavily involved in underwriting Argentine securities, and held a 
substantial amount of them in its portfolio because it had been unable to 
sell them to other investors at a profit. In November 1890 Barings lacked 
the liquidity to pay depositors. The Bank of England quickly organized a 
rescue mission, which wiped out most of the stockholders’ equity in Baring 
Brothers but prevented a financial crisis in London (Mokyr, 2003: 305). 
Argentina was not so lucky: it suffered a recession. The 1890 crisis 
differed from the characteristic banking crises of the nineteenth century for 
one main reason: despite the decrease in the nominal stock of money 
following the collapse, there was simultaneously a growth in both the price 
level and the income velocity of money (read: ratio of real output to real 
cash balances). The reason velocity almost doubled was that the public, 
distrustful of the monetary system, increasingly hoarded gold and silver 
from 1887 onward. The blame for this situation should be placed upon the 
monetary authorities for failing to create a system where paper currency 
maintained its purchasing power. That is, the results of the expansionary 
monetary policy being conductedwere negated by the lack of an effective 
Standard (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 70). 
In response to the crisis of 1890, the government more or less froze the 
stock of currency and established a body, the Caja de Conversión 
(translation: Conversion Office), eventually intended to re-establish a rigid 
rate of exchange for the Argentine peso into gold (Law 2471). After the 
recession at the start of the decade, the Argentine economy grew again. In 
1899, the combination of a frozen supply of currency and continued 
economic growth made the peso appreciate and the gold premium fall, a 
problem for those whose everyday transactions were dealt in gold: debtors 
who had contracted liabilities in gold, holders of securities for gold, and 
those who were paid in gold. Conversely, those who were paid in paper 
celebrated the increasing value of their money (U.S. Mint, 1909: 163).  
This period became known as the Belle Époque, or Golden Age,and it 
lasted until 1914, the onset of the First World War. During this time, due to 
its strong growth, Argentina was one of the world’s great emerging 
economies.Foreigners began to view Argentina as an ideal place to invest, 
and in no time Argentina’s economy became one of those most rapidly 
expanding in the world (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 79). One impetus for 
the influx of foreign investment was that Argentina switched from a 
floating exchange rate to the gold standard. Real output rose and Argentina 
experienced mild inflation of the prices of domesticgoods (della Paolera & 
Taylor, 2001: 121). In the period following the Baring Crisis, the Argentine 
government devoted its resources to stabilization and economic growth, 
paving the way to becoming an actor in the web of world financial markets 
(della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 80). This paper will not discuss in depth the 
Belle Époque period, except to say that it was beneficial to, and essential 
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for, the recovery of the Argentine economy following the Baring Crisis 
(della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 99). 
Arguably the most notable law that emerged from this period was the 
Law of Conversion, or Law No. 3871, proposed to Congress by President 
Julio Roca. It received influential support from then-senator Carlos 
Pellegrini,who had been president during the Baring crisis. The law, 
whichpassed on October 31, 1899, made the Caja de Conversióninto a 
currency board. The purpose of the Law was to create gold standard 
convertibility, which the monetary authorities set at a rate of 2.27 paper 
pesos per gold peso (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 120). (The ‚gold peso‛ 
was the definition of the peso as 1.45161 grams of gold established by Law 
1130 in 1881.) The Law of Conversion was composed of many sections, the 
first relating to the type of monetary regime that would be set up. By this 
article: 
The Conversion Office would have the singular responsibility of 
exchanging paper for specie (and vice versa) at a rate of exchange fixed by 
law at 44 gold cents per paper peso. Thus, any expansion or contraction in 
the amount of cash in circulation would exactly match the variations in the 
level of specie reserves on hand at the Conversion Office. With such a 
system of 100 percent marginal gold backing for the currency, there was a 
strict and inelastic relationship between variations in the stock of metallic 
reserves and variations in the monetary base. Consequently, all key 
autonomous monetary policy functions were proscribed such as operating 
on the open market to buy or sell public bonds in order to influence the 
level of interest rates, or the use of rediscounts to provide liquidity. In 
addition, there could not be any other types of guarantees offered by the 
Conversion Office, such as the provision of Lender-of-Last-Resort 
assistance to the financial system. The money supply had been rendered 
completely endogenous by this choice of regime. (della Paolera & Taylor, 
2001: 120) 
Another key aspect of the Law was the level of independence granted to 
the Caja de Conversión. It was composed of a board of five directors 
appointed by the executive branch that had to be approved by the Senate, 
with five-year terms in order to keep the institution politically 
independent. This clause of the Law proved useful, for during this time the 
Caja de Conversión remained uninfluenced by the other institutions of 
government (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 120). 
How was the rate of convertibility chosen? The Argentine government 
chose a rate of 44 per cent of the old gold parity, established in the 1880s, by 
‚calculating the average premium on gold during the 6 months preceding 
the date of the conversion law, which was found to have been 127.2 per 
cent,‛ that is, 1 gold pesos = 2.2272 paper pesos (U.S.Mint, 1909: 163). 
The Argentine monetary system at this time comprised many different 
institutions. The Caja de Conversión, the focus of this paper, issued notes 
(paper currency). Coins were issued by the mint. The Banco de la Nación 
Argentina, or the Bank of the Argentine Nation, succeeded the bankrupt 
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Banco Nacional as the country’s federally owned bank. It performed certain 
functions as a fiscal agent and as a politically influenced lender that in 
other countries were characteristic of central banks, although unlike a 
central bank it did not issue the monetary base. At this time there were also 
banks owned in whole or in part by the provincial governments, a bank 
owned by the city of Buenos Aires, locallyowned private banks, and 
multiple foreign banks (including the British-owned London and River 
Plate Bank and the Bank of Boston). 
 
2. The panic of 1907: Worst in the United States, but 
felt around the World 
The Panic of 1907 was a financial crisis that originated in the United 
States but affected many other countries. The tipping point in the United 
States was the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company on October 22 
and the closure of several other New York City trust companies and banks. 
J.P. Morgan, America’s leading financier, personally examined the assets of 
many of the troubled financial institutions in New York and organized a 
syndicate to rescue those he judged to be solvent. 
The United States by this time was the world’s largest economy, and 
New York was one of the world’s major financial centers. Tight conditions 
in the New York money market brought about by the financial crisis 
affected European markets, and ‚by November 4, the Bank of England’s 
[discount] rate would rise to seven percent, the highest since 1873‛ (Bruner 
& Carr, 2007: 113). Interest rates in France and Germany achieved similar 
levels soon after. George B. Cortelyou, appointed Secretary of the Treasury 
by President Theodore Roosevelt, once stated that there was ‚‘severe 
pressure’ on the money markets in those countries, and observed that the 
grave conditions were not ‘localized in the United States’‛ (Bruner & Carr, 
2007: 113; see also Johnson, 1908: 457). People in countries all over the 
world felt the effects of the crisis, including Europe, South America, Japan, 
and Egypt, where the public was ‚dissatisfied with the comparatively small 
returns yielded by high-priced railroad and industrial stocks‛ (Johnson, 
1908: 458). As we will see, though, the panic passed Argentina by, unlike 
the Barings crisis of 1890 and the international crisis that would occur when 
World War I broke out in 1914. 
 
3. What is a currency board? 
The purpose of a currency board is to maintain a fixed exchange rate of 
domestic currency to a foreign anchor currency. In the case of Argentina, its 
peso was pegged to gold in this era. The currency board’s main 
responsibilitywasto maintain the gold standard by overseeing external 
convertibility of the currency (Nakamura & Zarazaga, 2001: 8).  
An orthodox currency board is defined by three major features (see 
Hanke, 2002: 88). First, there must exist a fixed exchange rate with an 
anchor currency. For Argentina, the fixed exchange rate for the paper peso 
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was 44 centavos of the 1881 gold peso by the Law of Conversion. Second, 
there must be full convertibility, meaning no restrictions on exchanging the 
currency, from either side. During the period under study here, no such 
restriction existed. Last, net foreign reserves must be 100 percent of the 
monetary base, at least at the margin. This implies that an orthodox 
currency board’s monetary base and its foreign reserves change one-for-
one.The Caja de Conversión had a fixed, unbacked issue of 293 million 
pesos, and beyond that amount its issues were supposed to be backed one-
for-one by gold. (The Caja de Conversión’s foreign reserves consisted only 
of metallic gold, which earned no interest. Unlike other currency boards it 
did not hold interest-earning securities denominated in gold-convertible 
foreign currencies. Accordingly, it had no possibility of using interest 
earnings to eventually cover the unbacked issue. Covering the unbacked 
issue would have required allocations from the government budget.) 
 
4. Was the 1907-08 Caja de conversión an orthodox 
currency board? 
We will determine the orthodoxy of the Caja de Conversión during the 
1907-08 period by performing three different testson the data obtainedfrom 
the monthly statements for this period published in the Boletín Oficial. 
 
4.1. Test #1: Domestic Assets 
For a currency board to be considered orthodox, it is necessary that 
domestic assets are zero percent of total assets, or as close to zero as 
possible. (See Figure 1; data and sources for all graphs can be found in the 
accompanying spreadsheet workbook.) Commonly, a small amount of 
domestic assets is held by a currency board for payment of salaries and 
other expenses. The Caja de Conversiónadhered to this standard.Domestic 
assets began at 1.16 percent of total assets in April 1907 and remained 
around that level until August 1907 when they increased to 1.25 percent. 
Similarly, they remained relatively constant for seven months until March 
1908, when they dropped again to 1.19 percent. Even though the number 
spiked from late 1907 into early 1908, the level was close enough to zero 
throughout this period as a whole for the Caja de Conversión to satisfy this 
orthodoxy requirement.  
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Figure 1. Domestic assets as a percentage of total assets (0% = currency board orthodoxy) 
 
 
Figure 2. Monthly reserve pass-through (%). (100% = currency board orthodoxy) 
 
4.2. Test #2: Reserve pass-through 
The reserve pass-through ratio is the change in the monetary base 
divided by the change in net foreign assets (see Figure 2). For an orthodox 
currency board, this percentage should be as close to one hundred as 
possible. The reserve pass-through ratio is characteristically calculated on a 
year-over-year basis, but for this paper we calculated it on a monthly basis 
due to the frequency of the data being examined. For the data from 1907-08, 
the reserve pass-through ratio demonstrates the Caja de Conversión’s 
orthodoxy, as the rate stays relatively constant around 100 percent.  
 
4.3. Test #3: Change in the monetary base and net foreign assets as 
a percentage of the previous period’s monetary base 
Lastly, changes in the monetary base and net foreign assets as a 
percentage of the previous period’s monetary base can also be used to 
prove orthodoxy of a currency board (see Figure 3). Again, many times 
these data are calculated on a year-over-year basis; however, for this paper 
we calculated them on a monthly basisdue to the short time frame studied. 
The percentages turned out to be the same for all of the months examined, 
apart from June-July 1907 where the change in the monetary base as a 
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percentage of the previous period’s monetary base was-1.86 percent, while 
the change in net foreign assets as a percentage of the previous period’s 
monetary base was -1.92 percent. The one discrepancy that stood out was 
for the last month studied, March-April 1908, where the first calculation 
was zero percent and the second was 1.21 percent. 
 
 
Figure 3. Changes in monetary base and net foreign assets (% of previous period’s 
monetary base) 
 
5. Gauge of economic performance during this period 
Now that we have established that the 1907-08 Argentine Caja de 
Conversión was in fact an orthodox currency board, it is important to 
determine the effects, if any, this institution had on the economy of the 
country. The original reason for the implementation of the Caja de 
Conversiónwas to remedy the financial crisis caused by the shutdown of 
Barings in 1899. We are now going to look at the effects of the Caja. 
One way to determine the effectiveness of the Caja de Conversión 
during the 1907-08 period is by examining certain indicators. During the 
time the Caja was operating, the international economy experienced a high 
level of financial and monetary liquidity because of the amplified 
international stock of gold in the world (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 125). 
Additionally, the Argentine economy expanded during these years: from 
1899 through 1914, the level of real output grew at an accumulated rate of 
78.5 percent, or a compound rate of 5.2 percent a year. Additionally, the 
price level increased 36.3 percent over the fifteen-year period, ora 
compound rate of 2.4 percent a year (della Paolera & Taylor, 2001: 126). To 
establish a benchmark to the U.S., bank reserve ratios in the Argentine 
economy were three times higher than those of the U.S. (della Paolera & 
Taylor, 2001: 127). 
In order to collect a first-hand account of the economic and political 
situation at this time, we reviewed La Nación,then as now Argentina’s most 
highly reputed general-interest newspaper, at the beginning of the financial 
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crisis. The first mention of the turmoil came on Wednesday, October 23, 
1907, when the newspaper reported, ‚Gran alarma había producido esta 
mañana el anuncio hecho por el directorio del Mercantile National Bank 
previniendo a sus depositantes que las oficinas del Knickerbocker Trust se 
encargaban de arreglar sus respectivos créditos, en cuanto se sabía que 
dicho trust había recibido en depósito m{s de 60.000.000 de dólares. *…+ La 
desmoralización de la Bolsa neoyorkina repercutió en las bolsas de las 
provincias y especialmente en las de Pittsburg y Filadelfia‛ (La Nación, 
1908: 6). Roughly translated, the story said that ‚there was a great alarm at 
that morning’s announcement by the board of the Mercantile National 
Bank warning its depositors that the offices of the Knickerbocker Trust 
were responsible forsettling their claims, as it was known that the trust had 
received more than $60,000,000. *…+ The demoralization of the New York 
Stock Exchange impacted the markets of the provinces and especially those 
in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.‛La Nación continued to report signs of the 
beginning of the U.S. financial panic, and only one week later, on October 
30, 1907, the newspaper’s section about the United States was entitled ‚La 
Crisis Financiera: Repercusión el comercio,‛ or ‚The Financial Crisis: 
Impact on trade.‛ Translated, this article reports that, according to New 
Orleans telegraphic reports, the Louisiana Market and that of New Orleans 
have suspended their operations until the following June (La Nación, 1908: 
5). On November 4, La Nación reported that the principal financial 
institutions had asked President Roosevelt to discuss the financial situation 
to reestablish public confidence. Clearly, the situation was worsening each 
day. 
In order to build upon this first-hand account, we reviewed The Review 
of the River Plate from the first half of 1908.2 The account shows that there 
was a period of turbulence in Argentina as a consequence of the problems 
the world was facing. Starting around October 15, 1907, the U.S. financial 
crisis began, and it affected Argentina for several months. As detailed in 
the Review of the River Plateon January 24, 1908, ‚Telegrams from Dallas 
(Texas) report that the banking institution there, known as the Western 
Bank Trust, has gone into liquidation‛ (Review of the River Plate, 1908). On 
February 7, it was reported that ‚the Oriental Bank of New York has closed 
its doors‛ (Review of the River Plate, 1908: 224), and in Argentina, ‚it is 
evident that the market is not quite certain what will be the result of the 
present political effervescence‛ and ‚banks show less interest and prices 
are a shade weaker‛ (Review of the River Plate, 1908: 245). The last week of 
February did not bring any progress, as ‚business in the stock and share 
market remains very dull, nor are there signs of any improvement in the 
 
2The Review of the River Plate wasa tri-monthly publication issued between 1892 and 1995 in 
Buenos Aires, detailing the country’s economic performance over the specified time 
period. It is widely acknowledged as containing some of the shrewdest contemporary 
analysis of Argentina’s economy. The Review of the River Plate from 1907 was unable to be 
used for analysis. The book is too brittle and even though it is currently held in the Library 
of Congress, patrons cannot use it because of its preservation status. 
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near future‛ (Review of the River Plate, 1908: 535). (Argentine President José 
Figueroa Alcorta narrowly escaped an anarchist attempt to bomb himon 
February 28). However, as the Southern Hemisphere summer came to a 
close, the mood in Argentine financial marketsimproved, with the situation 
in New York: come April, ‚the Knickerbocker Trust Company resumed 
operation on the 26th ult., and the public now has full confidence in this 
institution‛ (Review of the River Plate, 1908: 865). 
 
6. Other economic indicators 
Below, Figures 4 and 5 show total gold in the banks and gold in the 
banks by sector, respectively. For most of the categories, data is only 
available starting in April 1907. It is clear that the amount of gold in ‚other 
national banks‛ (locally owned banks other than the Bank of the Argentine 
Nation) peaked in June 1907, while the amount of gold in other institutions 
remained constant. At this time, total gold in the banks increased as well, 
starting at approximately 30.32 million gold pesos in May 1907, soaring to 
36.62 million gold pesos in June 1907, and leveling off at 35.53 million gold 
pesos in July 1907. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the bank deposits from January 1907 through 
December 1908.  Data for deposits in other ‚national banks‛ and foreign 
banks begin in April 1907, while data for the Bank of the Argentine Nation 
and total bank deposits begin in January 1908. From the total bank 
deposits, it can be seen that in 1908 financial institutions did not experience 
any major economic crises, as total bank deposits increased almost every 
month of the year. However, when deposits are broken down into different 
categories, a different story emerges. Deposits in ‚other national banks‛ 
and deposits in foreign banks move in the same direction, but the monthly 
change in deposits in foreign banks is much less volatile. The reason for the 
difference is unclear. 
 
 
Figure 4. Gold in the banks: Total (million gold pesos) 
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Figure 5. Gold in the banks: By category (million godl pesos) 
 
 
Figure 6. Bank deposits: Total (million godl pesos) 
 
 
Figure 7. Bank deposits: By categories (million godl pesos) 
 
Della Paolera & Taylor (2003) detail the progress of a variety of statistics 
relating to Argentina’s 1907 economy. Industrial output was rapidly 
increasing in the early twentieth century, and this trend did not falter 
during 1907, totaling 179.12 (note: index 1900 = 100) (della Paolera & 
Taylor, 2003: 265). Another interesting statistic della Paolera and Taylor 
studied was the ratio to GDP of credit supply and money supply. For all 
banks, the 1907 ratio of 0.26 was similar to those of the previous and 
following years. The ratios of private banks and foreign banks to GDP also 
remained steady. The ratio of bank loans by Banco de la Nación Argentina 
to GDP was 0.07 and that of all U.S. banks to GDP was consistent at 0.39. 
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Broad money for Argentina remained constant with a ratio of 0.4. 
However, 1907 was the last year that this ratio remained at a constant level 
in the U.S. and U.K. The broad money ratio for the U.S. to GDP was 
between 0.48 and 0.49 from 1902 to 1907, but in 1908 it rapidly increased to 
0.56. Similarly, the broad money ratio for the U.K. to GDP was 0.52 in 1906 
and 0.51 in 1907, but was significantly higher in the previous and following 
years (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003: 314). 
Argentina’s main exports at the time were wheat and wool, which 
together accounted for nearly half of all its exports by value. The 
newspaper sources previously mentioned and subsequent statistical 
compilations indicate that neither experienced more than the normal 
variation in prices in 1907-1908. 
 
7. Conclusion 
From the information collected, Argentina escaped spillover from the 
1907 United States financial crisis. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show that the effects 
from the financial panic that hit the United States and some other markets 
were mild in Argentina, affectingat most only the first few months of 1908. 
However, Figure 7 demonstrates that bank deposits were choppy 
throughout most of 1907. Due to the lack of access of the 1907 Review of the 
River Plate, it is hard to form a definite conclusion. 
It is clear, however, that the 1907-08 Argentine currency boardwas an 
orthodox one. The design of the Caja de Conversión, by Law No. 3871, 
created an independent entity, uninfluenced by the executive branch, that 
was responsible for the conversion of pesos into gold at the fixed rate of 44 
per cent of the previous gold parity. The Caja was responsible for 
conversion of pesos on demand. The three keyorthodoxy conditions were 
satisfied by the Caja de Conversión at this time: domestic assets were 
around zero percent; the reserve pass-through ratio was nearly 100 
hundred percent for all months; and the changes in the monetary base and 
net foreign assets as a percentage of the previous period’s monetary base 
were equal for the majority of the months assessed.3 
 
8. Afterword 
Economic success followed the 1907-08 financial crisis. The Caja de 
Conversión continued its functions until the First World War began in 
1914, halting Law 3871. However, during the Belle Époque, the fifteen years 
between the transformation of the Caja de Conversióninto a currency board 
and the First World War, Argentina became a leader in international trade 
and finance. Anannual report of the U.S. Mint remarked, ‚as regards*to+ 
 
3It is important to note that many of the conditions for orthodoxy are typically calculated on 
a year-over-year basis, whereas in this analysis they were calculated on a month-by-month 
basis. The reason they are usually calculated year-over-year is to reduce the statistical 
noise arising from monthly variance in expenses. This may affect the significance of the 
results; however, the calculations proved conclusive enough to study. 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 A. Popkin, JEB, 6(4), 2019, p.404-416. 
415 
415 
the staple industries of this country, they are now spread over such an 
immense area, which is being constantly enlarged, that the Republic maybe 
considered practically secure against such a general failure of production as 
to cause a derangement of the monetary system by the necessary outflow of 
gold in satisfaction of public and private obligations‛ (U.S. Mint,1909: 165). 
Though this pronouncement proved untrue in the long run, it shows the 
state of confidence in the banking system at the time. 
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